Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What do Twenty-three Million Bank Loans Say about the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?

We investigate the impact of the stance and path of monetary policy on the level of credit risk of individual bank loans and on lending standards. We employ the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain that contains detailed monthly information on virtually all loans granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain during the last twenty-two years – generating almost twenty-three million bank loan records in total. Spanish monetary conditions were exogenously determined during the entire sample period. Using a variety of duration models we find that lower short-term interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting more risky new loans. Banks also soften their lending standards – they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with high uncertainty. Lower interest rates, by contrast, reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans. Loan credit risk is maximized when both interest rates are very low prior to loan origination and interest rates are very high over the life of the loan. Our results suggest that low interest rates increase bank risk-taking, reduce credit risk in banks in the very short run but worsen it in the medium run. Risk-taking is not equal for all type of banks: Small banks, banks with fewer lending opportunities, banks with less sophisticated depositors, and savings or cooperative banks take on more extra risk than other banks when interest rates are lower. Higher GDP growth reduces credit risk on both new and outstanding loans, in stark contrast to the differential effects of monetary policy.monetary policy;low interest rates;financial stability;lending standards;credit risk;risk-taking;business cycle;bank organization;duration analysis

The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower Welfare

We estimate the impact of bank merger announcements on borrowers' stock prices for publicly-traded Norwegian firms.In addition, we analyze how bank mergers influence borrower relationship termination behavior and relate the propensity to terminate to borrower abnormal returns.We obtain four main results.First, on average borrowers lose about one percent in equity value when their bank is announced as a merger target.Small borrowers of target banks are especially hurt in large bank mergers, where they lose an average of about three percent.Second, bank mergers lead to higher relationship exit rates for three years after a bank merger, and small bank mergers lead to larger increases in exit rates than large mergers.Third, target borrower abnormal returns are positively related to pre-merger exit rates, indicating that firms that find it easier to switch banks are less harmed when their bank merges.Fourth, we find weak evidence that target borrowers with large merger-induced increases in exit rates are more negatively affected by bank merger announcements, suggesting that target borrowers are forced out of relationships and suffer welfare losses as a result of bank mergers.banks;mergers;bank lending

Credit Supply versus Demand: Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels in Good and Crisis Times

Abstract: Banking crises involve periods of persistently low credit and economic growth. Banks’ balance sheets are then weak but so are those of non-financial corporate borrowers. Hence, a crucial question is whether credit growth is low due to supply or to demand factors. However convincing identification has been elusive due to a lack of detailed loan application-, bank-, and firm-level data. Access to a dataset of loan applications in Spain that is matched with complete bank and firm balance-sheet data covering the period from 2002 to 2010 allows us to identify bank and firm balancesheet channels. We find robust evidence showing that bank balance-sheet strength determines the success of loan applications and the granting of loans in crisis times. The heterogeneity in firm balance-sheet strength determines loan granting in both good and crisis times, although the potency of this firm balance-sheet channel is the largest in the latter period. Our findings therefore hold important implications for both theory and policy.bank lending channel;credit supply;business cycle;credit crunch;capital;liquidity

Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy:What do Twenty-three Million Bank Loans Say about the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk?

We investigate the impact of the stance and path of monetary policy on the level of credit risk of individual bank loans and on lending standards. We employ the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain that contains detailed monthly information on virtually all loans granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain during the last twenty-two years – generating almost twenty-three million bank loan records in total. Spanish monetary conditions were exogenously determined during the entire sample period. Using a variety of duration models we find that lower short-term interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting more risky new loans. Banks also soften their lending standards – they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with high uncertainty. Lower interest rates, by contrast, reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans. Loan credit risk is maximized when both interest rates are very low prior to loan origination and interest rates are very high over the life of the loan. Our results suggest that low interest rates increase bank risk-taking, reduce credit risk in banks in the very short run but worsen it in the medium run. Risk-taking is not equal for all type of banks: Small banks, banks with fewer lending opportunities, banks with less sophisticated depositors, and savings or cooperative banks take on more extra risk than other banks when interest rates are lower. Higher GDP growth reduces credit risk on both new and outstanding loans, in stark contrast to the differential effects of monetary policy.

Credit Supply versus Demand:Bank and Firm Balance-Sheet Channels in Good and Crisis Times

Abstract: Banking crises involve periods of persistently low credit and economic growth. Banks’ balance sheets are then weak but so are those of non-financial corporate borrowers. Hence, a crucial question is whether credit growth is low due to supply or to demand factors. However convincing identification has been elusive due to a lack of detailed loan application-, bank-, and firm-level data. Access to a dataset of loan applications in Spain that is matched with complete bank and firm balance-sheet data covering the period from 2002 to 2010 allows us to identify bank and firm balancesheet channels. We find robust evidence showing that bank balance-sheet strength determines the success of loan applications and the granting of loans in crisis times. The heterogeneity in firm balance-sheet strength determines loan granting in both good and crisis times, although the potency of this firm balance-sheet channel is the largest in the latter period. Our findings therefore hold important implications for both theory and policy.